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Distance, Size and Turmoil: North-
South Mediterranean Interactions
J. Patrick Rhamey, William R. Thompson and Thomas J. Volgy
1 Relative  to  other  states,  it  would  appear  European  states  in  the  Northern
Mediterranean  take  greater  notice  of  countries  on  the  southern  littoral  of  the
Mediterranean. For example, as instability spread first to Egypt and then Libya during
the Arab Spring, Northern Mediterranean states, in particular France, were quick to
interject, supporting protestors and rebels. Likewise, as the Civil War in Syria continues
to  escalate,  leaders  of  European  states  on  the  Mediterranean  have  more  strongly
advocated in favor of intervention than their counterparts in Northern Europe or the
United States. Are these instances of European involvement scarce or the norm? Do
Europeans  also  involve  themselves  with  the  south  in  the  formation  of  cooperative
architecture and economic integration? 
2 We suggest in this paper that while this behavior is quite scarce among Mediterranean
states  as  a  whole,  it  typically  takes  the  form of  large,  North  Mediterranean  states
interacting  with  former  colonies  contingent  upon  levels  of  domestic  stability  or
turmoil. However, the extent to which these interactions take place is limited to these
bilateral relationships, is inconsistent, and is decreasing over time, providing strong
evidence  for  the  absence  of  a  politically  salient  Mediterranean region.  Likewise,  as
these interactions become more limited, the prospects for future Pan-Mediterranean
integration and the relative effectiveness of promoting regionalist integration through
institutions such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership appear bleak. 
3 First, we discuss the existing literature on Mediterranean political and economic order
and how such order may have an impact on states within the region. As with regions
and  neighborhoods  elsewhere,  these  clusters  of  states  with  overlapping  interests
frequently  provide  the  basis  for  emerging  regional  architecture  and  stability,  and
evidence of the Mediterranean region’s emergence would suggest hopeful prospects for
increased stability in the future. Second, using network analysis, we analyze patterns of
events  over  time  to  uncover  the  extent  to  which  a  region  may  be  emerging,  or
alternatively,  if  the  Mediterranean  remains  a  centuries  old  geopolitical  barrier.
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Through inspecting clusters and densities in political and economic relationships, our
findings suggest differences in foreign policy portfolios between North and South are
dramatic and do not reflect levels of multilateral cohesiveness present in other regional
subsystems.
4 However,  the  network  analysis  does  suggest  that  some  relationships  are  present
despite  the  absence  of  more  multilateral  patterns  of  behavior.  Finally,  using  a
regression analysis of cooperative and conflictual events,  we analyze the contextual
factors  that  influence  the  degree  to  which  Northern  states  are  attentive  to  their
Southern counterparts. Findings demonstrate that North states respond with conflict
when conflict occurs in the South, but cooperate primarily with their former colonies
during periods of  domestic  stability.  However,  the extent  to  which Northern states
engage in either cooperation or conflict has gradually decreased since the initial period
of decolonization following the Second World War.
 
The Problem and Importance of Regional Politics
5 As a geopolitical entity, the Mediterranean possesses a unique yet diverse cultural and
historical heritage, ranging from a cohesive political zone under the Roman Empire to a
fractured and highly salient geographic feature serving as both a contact point and a
dividing barrier between Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim worlds. Likewise the
field of Mediterranean studies spans across a range of fields including classics,1 history,
2 literature,3 and political science.4 While the relevant collection of states and societies
that  comprise  the  proposed  region is  typically  defined  along  the  lines  of  common
historical  heritage,  climate  and  agriculture,  and  anthropological  development,5
analyzing a region as a unique space requires specification of regional identity within a
pattern of interactions, political or economic, rather than arbitrarily fixed definitions
lest issues of relevance bias our findings.6
6 On  issues  of  political  interaction,  much  of  the  extant  literature  on  Mediterranean
politics  highlights  the possibilities  and interests  surrounding what might or  should
emerge in the geopolitical space rather than what is truly present.7 However, these
prescriptive discussions aimed toward engineering policies fostering a Mediterranean
community  have demonstrated limited support  for  a  “convergence  of  civilizations”
since  the  Barcelona  Declaration  of  1995.8 While  the  desire  and  foundations  of
cooperative institutional structure may be present, the integration goal of a free trade
area by 2010, for example, has not yet been met.
7 In this respect, the Mediterranean represents a similar trend in regional analysis of a
failed  attempt  at  region  or  neighborhood  cohesion  exhibited  in  Central  Europe
following the Visegrad agreement. While like the Mediterranean, the idea of a Central
European  region  has  strong  historical  inspiration  and  geopolitical  precedent,  the
political application of the idea into a unique set of multilateral relationships failed to
coalesce  as  economic  policy  was  superseded  by  the  broader  European  Union,  and
Poland sought stronger relationships with Western Europe and exhibited almost no
interest in its own neighborhood.9
8 To  the  extent  that  observable  trends  are  present, the  literature  emphasizes  the
degeneration  of  cooperative  possibilities  toward  more  conflictual  concerns
surrounding  security  maintenance,  often  unilaterally  driven  by  French  activism.10
Indeed, according to some, the very idea of a Mediterranean region is a neocolonial
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French  construction  to  further  French  interests.11 What  non-security  interactions
remain  are  limited  to  bilateral  rather  than  the  desired  multilateral  economic
interactions,  usually  surrounding  a  North  Mediterranean  reliance  on  southern  oil
exports.12 While EU states do not perceive direct interstate threats as emerging from
the south, internal conflicts from within and between southern states have led to a
more detached security approach.13 
9 The breakdown in European commitment to the Barcelona process can be partially
attributed  to  the  continued  instability  in  the  Middle  East  and  Maghreb.  Bilateral
relations by European states have shifted away from economic development toward
conflict management and containment, evident in the empirical findings of this paper,
and have met somewhat limited progress.14 Indeed, some conclude that these pressures
enshrined in the push toward regional construction have had destabilizing effects.15 
10 In many respects, this deterioration of North-South relationships represents a reversal
of  Cold War politics  in the Mediterranean,  complicated by unidirectional  migration
patterns to Western Europe from the Middle East and Maghreb.16 The observer is left
with  the  impression  of  an  inter-regional  process  of  limited  interaction  between
neighboring groups fueled by intra-regional instability in the southern littoral of the
geopolitical space. As the threat of increased migration returns, Europeans hesitate in
spreading neoliberal economic policies that would provide possibilities toward region
formation and integration.17
11 However, within the context of political analysis, non-arbitrary means of identifying
political cohesion is necessary prior to analyzing regional outcomes (e.g. the amounts
of  cooperation,  levels  of  architecture,  or  management  of  security  concerns).
Misspecification of regional membership may lead to improper measurement in both
independent and dependent variables,18 a conflation of global with regional behaviors,19
or a biased conceptualization of regional membership, often from a US or Eurocentric
perspective,  leading  to  an  inaccurate  interpretation  of  the  presence  or  absence  of
multilateral behaviors.
12 In evaluating whether the Mediterranean exists as a politically relevant subset of states
rather  than simply a  rhetorical  aspiration of  potential  members,  we determine the
extent to which states exhibit “regional” patterns of behavior apart from the broader
international system that would signify a meaningful cluster of states ripe for the type
of analysis typically conducted in comparative regionalist research.20
 
Group Cohesiveness
13 Definitions of regions vary quite dramatically,21 including spaces defined by arbitrary
geographic  designations,22 the  systemic  interactions  of  major  powers, 23 shared
historical  or  cultural  attributes  among  states,24 and/or  shared  state  institutional
membership.25 For  the  purpose  of  evaluating  the  regional  aspirations  of  the
Mediterranean expressed in the 1990s,  it  is  unnecessary for us to take sides in this
conceptual  debate.  We do instead explore the patterns of  interactions,  cooperative,
conflictual,  institutional,  and  economic,  that  the  comparative  regionalist  literature
would generally expect to be present to some degree in a relevant region and that
should  increase  over  time  if  the  attempts  at  regionalization  articulated  in  the
Barcelona declaration are meaningfully impacting state behaviors.
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14 To evaluate the shifting cohesiveness of potential Mediterranean group members over
time and the underlying variables that contribute to these changing values, we employ
both  qualitative  and  quantitative  approaches.  To  judge  the  evolution  of  the
Mediterranean  over  the  past  two  decades,  we  employ  a  qualitative,  comparative
analysis  of  interstate  interactions  in  the  Mediterranean  Basin  from  1993-2002  and
2003-2012 using network analysis. The primary empirical question of this analysis lies
in both the strength of region members’ interactions as well as the change in those
interactions  across  the  two  periods  of  examination.  Observing  cooperative  and
conflictual behaviors and trade relationships, we conclude that some possibilities of
regional  cohesion  may  have  been  present  in  the  early  period,  coinciding  with  the
articulation of aspirations in the Barcelona Declaration, but the second period exhibits
a rapid erosion of these possibilities.
15 To  evaluate  the  degree  of  Mediterranean  cohesiveness,  we  employ  as  our  pool  of
possible members all states within the traditional anthropological geographic space of
the Mediterranean Basin, including those states bordering the Mediterranean Sea plus
Portugal.26 Given  the  established  regional clustering  of  Europe,  Middle  East,  and
Maghreb across most definitions, our interest in gauging the extent of Mediterranean
regional development lies in the degree to which bridging behaviors occur between
these  existing  clusterings.  Thus,  we  are  evaluating  the  possible  transition  from
rhetorical aspiration of meaningful interaction to manifest regional behaviors between
North and South Mediterranean spaces, as opposed to the Mediterranean remaining or
increasing as a salient geographic barrier to interactions.
16 The  following  network  diagrams  in  Figures  1-4,  divide  the  Mediterranean  into
Northern and Southern states, and we illustrate the number of meaningful interactions
that occur between these two groups.27 In addition to the Mediterranean (nodes shown
in green), we include as a baseline for comparison the surrounding regional clusters:
non-Mediterranean  Europe  (blue),  West  Africa  (red),  and  the  Middle  East  (yellow).
Relative position in the illustration between nodes denotes the level of similarity states
have in their patterns of behavior through a principal components layout.
17 For all diagrams across all periods, a meaningful amount of interactions is a dyad in
which the two states exhibit above average amounts of interaction relative to all dyads
globally. For example, if there is a line shown between Spain and Morocco in the trade
diagram,  it  means  that  the  amount  of  trade  as  a  proportion  of  each  state’s  gross
domestic product (GDP) within the dyad is above average compared to all other dyads,
globally,  within  the  year.  The  selected  threshold  is  a  very  minimal  amount  of
interaction that may constitute a meaningful relationship across our three metrics.28
For each metric,  we then sum the number of interactions that we observe between
North and South and compare the degree to which they change across the two periods. 
18 Figure 1  illustrates  the  relationships  between  states  on  political  cooperation  from
1993-2002.29 For cooperation, two states have a tie if they have above average levels of
cooperation  exhibited  between  them  as  a  percentage  of  their  total  cooperation
globally, compared to the behaviors of all states, globally. As an example, Turkey and
Libya have a tie. That tie means that the percentage of Turkey’s cooperation directed
toward Libya, and vice versa, is above average compared with all dyads globally. Our
measure  of  cooperative  events  is  extracted  from  the  Integrated  Data  for  Events
Analysis (IDEA).30 The data lists individual events across each dyad. We take the dyadic
totals across the ten year period to calculate the proportion of a state’s cooperation
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directed toward another state. Following Goldstein, we scale the relative value of each
event by its severity.31 
19 Immediately  obvious is  the clear  gulf  between the North Mediterranean,  clustering
with the blue nodes in Europe, and the South Mediterranean, clustering primarily with
the Middle East in yellow, signifying at least some meaningful division in the patterns
of behavior between states on either side of the Mediterranean, albeit quite a few ties
exist. As a percentage of all possible ties between North and South, 35% are present in
the 1993-2002 period.
20 Figure 2 shows the same illustration of cooperation but for the 2003-2012 time period.
First,  the  behaviors  are  somewhat  less  polarized  as  evidenced  by  the  more  even
distribution of nodes in the illustration compared to Figure 1. This decline in observed
clustering is likely a result of increased interactions centering on the European Union
by  most  states  in  the  diagram.  However,  the  amount  of  meaningful  interactions
between North and South Mediterranean states actually decline to 16% of possible ties,
less than half the number of meaningful ties from the previous period. The differences
between which states choose to strongly interact with may be declining (particularly
the major powers),  but their levels of  cooperative interaction with one another,  an
important possible indicator of a distinctive region, dramatically decline.
 
Figure 1. Patterns of Cooperation, 1993-2002
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Figure 2. Patterns of Cooperation, 2003-2012
21 Alternatively,  given  recent  developments  in  the  Arab  world,  it  may  be  that  the
Mediterranean has evolved to be a uniquely interactive set of states centered around
conflictual behaviors in spite of Barcelona’s intentions. A set of unique, local security
concerns  may  provide  the  catalyst  for  regional  formation  and  engagement,  as
conflictual activities, not infrequently originating within states, may spread to engulf
the broader regional space.32 Following a similar course of action as was utilized in
analyzing  cooperative  interactions,  we  examine  conflictual  interactions.33 Figure 3
shows the above average conflictual interactions between states from 1993-2002. Unlike
cooperation in the first period, conflictual patterns are somewhat low, with only 14% of
possible ties present. Figure 4 also demonstrates that the conflictual interactions in the
second period exhibit little change in the level of interaction between North and South,
again remaining at only 14% of possible ties observed.34 
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Figure 3. Patterns of Conflict, 1993-2002
 
Figure 4. Patterns of Conflict, 2003-2012
22 While levels of cooperation appear to be deteriorating across the Mediterranean, and
conflict remains fixed, other evidence for regional formation may exist. As Powers and
Goertz suggest, regional economic institutions play a pivotal role in the development of
multilateral cooperation in both economic and security arenas.35 One possibility is that
despite  the  decline  in  high  level  interactions  that  may  be  picked  up  by  IDEA,
meaningful architecture has developed to facilitate a set of more informal interactions.
Figure 4  shows  the  contemporary  inter-regional  formal  intergovernmental
organizations across the Mediterranean.36 Clearly, in terms of formal architecture, the
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two groups  of  states  remain even more  strongly  divided,  with  only  one  shared tie
between France and Morocco.
23 Figure 5 should not suggest that attempts at inter-regional architectural development
do not exist.  Failed efforts in inter-regional architectural  development abound: The
Mediterranean  Dialogue  in  1990;  Council  of  the  Mediterranean  in  1992;  Réserve
Internationale Maritime en Méditerranée Occidentale in 1993; Mediterranean Forum in
1994; the  Barcelona  Declaration  of  1995.  Unfortunately  these  meetings,  plans,  and
aspirations have yet to develop into effective, formal intergovernmental organizations
that span both the northern and southern rims of the Mediterranean Basin.
 
Figure 5. Inter-Regional Formal Intergovernmental Organizations, 2010
24 There  is  an  additional  possibility  that  may  lend  evidence  to  the  development  of
interesting regional interactions in the Mediterranean Basin that would not necessarily
be  evident  in  the  previous  networks  of  cooperation,  conflict,  and  institutional
formation. While formal political structures may not demonstrate meaningful cross-
regional  development  across  the  twenty-year  period,  perhaps  more  informal
interactions have coalesced over time. In this respect, one possible measure that may
provide insights is the level of trade interdependence between states in the region.
Unlike previous measures, trade generally involves economic decisions made typically
by individual and firms within states, while states generally manage the terms of such
economic  interaction.  Figure 6  illustrates  the  network  of  meaningful  trading
relationships between European,  West  African,  Maghreb,  and Middle  East  Countries
from  1993-2002,  where  similar  to  the  diagrams  of  cooperation  and  conflict,  a
meaningful relationship between two states represents an above average amount of
trade between the countries as a proportion of their total trade, relative to all dyads
globally – a very low threshold. Trade data is taken from the Correlates of War dataset
of bilateral trade.37
25 Similar  to  patterns  of  political  cooperation  between  states,  this  first  time  period
(1993-2002)  provides some suggestion of  regional  coalescence,  overlapping with the
Barcelona meeting in 1995. Tight clustering in trade behavior similarity is somewhat
evident,  with  Portugal,  Turkey,  Croatia,  Malta,  and  Greece  clustering  closely  with
Israel,  Algeria,  Tunisia,  Libya,  Morocco  and  Syria.  However,  their  proximity  in
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positioning on the diagram merely suggests that they have similar ties in how they
behave with all  other  nodes,  not  that  they necessarily  have relationships  with one
another. In fact, only 14% of the possible ties between North and South Mediterranean
are made, suggesting that their behaviors are instead directed toward actors outside
the Mediterranean Basin. These similar ties outside the region are with the large non-
Mediterranean  European  economies  such  as  Russia  and  Germany,  which  is  why
Mediterranean states appear to behave similarly to states in the Middle East and West
Africa. Each of these geographic spaces on the periphery of Europe trades strongly with
the largest economies in the European region.
 
Figure 6. Patterns of trading relationships for 1993-2002
26 But  do  strong  trading  relationships  increase  in  the  recent  time  period?  Given  the
emphasis  of  Mediterranean  aspirations  on  greater  economic  cooperation,  we  may
expect  that  economic  ties  should  be  the  ones  that  are  most  likely  to  demonstrate
evidence of regional development over time. Figure 7 illustrates trading relationships
for 2003-2009.38 While the states in the Mediterranean again display a similar focus on
the large European economies, along with the states of the West Africa and the non-
Mediterranean  Middle  East,  interactions  between  the  states  on  the  Mediterranean
Basin decline substantially to only 4%. The only strong North-South trade relationships
that  remain  in  the  most  recent  time  period  are  Slovenia-Israel,  Croatia-Israel,  and
Turkey-Israel. To an extent, the illustrations of trading relationships do suggest that
while the Mediterranean states do not cluster consistently as a separate group apart
from  Europe,  they  are  focused  on  European  economic  actively,  broadly  defined,
particularly those in the Maghreb. However, the possibility of a unique subset of states
that  would  fit  the  definition  of  a  region  or  neighborhood,  or  fit  the  aspirations
expressed in the Barcelona declaration, appears to be absent.
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Figure 7. Patterns of trading relationships for 2003-2009
 
Who Interacts When?
27 While  clear  evidence  of  a  unique  Mediterranean  region  may  not  be  present  in
observations of states’ political and economic interactions, it is clear that some states
seem to be consistently active (France, Israel). These patterns of behaviors by the few
engaged  states  may  shed  light  on  the  contextual  elements  or  impediments  to  the
potential region’s evolution from aspiration to practice. For example, France typically
directs at least five to six times more of its foreign policy interactions as a proportion
of its total foreign policy toward the South Mediterranean than other members of the
North Mediterranean.39 Furthermore, despite the presence of multilateral interactions,
special  bilateral  relationships  consistently  appear  in  the  data,  such  as  Spain  and
Morocco, Italy and Libya, or Slovenia and Israel.40 These may take the form of high level
cooperative and conflictual political events surrounding migration or oil exports, as in
the case of Italy and Libya, or strong economic relationships, such as the exchange of
heavy machinery for agricultural products between Slovenia and Israel. 
28 To explore  the generalizable  context  of  when these  unique relationships  occur,  we
engage in a regression analysis of the proportion of a North state’s total foreign policy
activity directed toward southern states. Given the sporadic nature of the interactions
from the preceding network analysis, we hypothesize that North states choose to avoid
southern states given the levels of domestic instability present within South states. Not
only would this domestic instability argument capture the reluctance of North states to
expend scarce economic and political resources on fostering relationships with states
in  the  South,  but  it  would  also  explain  why  the  southern  states  that  do  receive
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attention  from  the  North  (Morocco  and  Israel),  unlike  their  neighbors,  experience
these actions.
29 To test our hypothesis, we use as the dependent variable a North state’s cooperative or
conflictual  interactions with South states  as  a  proportion of  the North state’s  total
global cooperation or conflict, where the unit of analysis is the directed dyad-year. As
with our network analysis, we test cooperative and conflictual interactions separately
to  explore  whether  there  are  different  dynamics  for  the  two  types  of  behaviors.
Furthermore, we conduct this test for two times periods, the 1988-2012 period covered
by IDEA and discussed above, as well as the political behaviors 1950-1980 coded by the
Conflict  and  Peace  Data  Bank  (COPDAB).41 COPDAB  is  coded  similar  to  IDEA,  albeit
differences in coding sensitivity, news sources, and event severity weighting require
the two times periods to be tested separately. Furthermore, a separate test can control
for the effect the Cold War may have on Mediterranean behaviors. 
30 Our independent variable of interest is domestic instability,  based on the internally
coded events within COPDAB and IDEA, and weighted by severity (e.g. a civil war, coup,
or riots). Given the types of events coded, these domestic conflictual events present a
suitable measurement of the levels of domestic instability within a state. Anecdotally
supporting the measurement’s validity, the greatest levels of domestic conflict in the
data are associated with Libya in 2011. As an alternative measure,42 we also include the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s measure of domestic armed conflict experiencing at
least 25 battle deaths.43
31 As controls we include whether the southern state in the directed dyad is a former
colony  of  the  northern  state,  as  clearly  post-colonial  relationships  may  provide
important  foundations  (or  impediments)  for  further  interactions.  We  also  include
economic growth in the Southern state,  measured as the change in GDP per capita
annually, as Northern states may develop greater interests in booming economies to
the south. As a final control, we also include a simple time counter to control for the
temporal  nature  of  the  data.  Given  the  clear  changes  over  time  illustrated  by  our
network  analysis,  we  expect  that  the  effect  of  time  will  likely  be  significant  and
negative,  corresponding with the steady decline of  interactions between North and
South discussed above.
32 The results of our regression analyses are shown in Table 1. In the Cold War period,
domestic conflict appears to operate counter our expectations. In Model 1, testing for
conflict by northern states directed toward southern states in the Cold War, we find
that the presence of a large violent conflict within a South state increases the amount
of conflict directed toward the South state by a North state by 10%. In Model 2, the test
of cooperation directed toward South states in the Cold War, neither domestic conflict
variable  is  significant,  with  northern  states  cooperating  less  with  former  colonies
compared with other South Mediterranean states by 2%. In both models, as expected,
the time counter is  significant,  with the amount of  interactions decreasing by ≈ 1%
annually.
 
Table 1. Regression results for the effect of Domestic Stability on North-South Interactions
 
1950-1978 1988-2012
Conflict Cooperation Conflict Cooperation
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Colony (0, 1) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)** .004 (.002)* .004 (.002)*





Domestic Armed Conflict .1 (.05)** .00 (.02) -.01 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Change in GDP per capita
(%)






-.0004 (.0001)** -.0004 (.0001)**
Constant .08 (.02)** .05 (.01)** .02 (.01)** .02 (.01)**
Adj. R2 .01 .04 .04 .03
N 430 434 1224 1224
Coefficient (standard error); * significant at .1; ** significant at .05
33 Close examination of these Cold War conflicts suggests that Cold War intervention in
post-colonial  political  development  is  strongly  affecting  our  findings.  The  former
colony variable is not significant, but the large, violent conflicts in the data during this
time period typically have some relationship to the broader systemic struggle between
East and West and experience external intervention, such as the Syrian coup d’état in
1962 or the 1958 Lebanon Crisis. Our findings in Models 3 and 4 for the post-Cold War
period, however, fit the expectations of our hypothesis. Each Goldstein scaled domestic
conflictual event decreases the amount of conflict directed toward the southern state
by the northern state by .000001%. 
34 While  at  first  this  may seem a  substantively  very  small  amount,  a  state  like  Egypt
experiences approximately four thousand Goldstein scaled events annually, meaning
only  a  ten  percent  increase  in  the  amount  of  domestic  conflict  would  results  in  a
decrease  of  approximately  .04%,  significantly  meaningful  given  that  the  average
proportion of a northern state’s foreign policy directed toward southern states is less
than  1 percent.  Similarly,  domestic  conflicts  in  southern  states  correspond  with
observed avoidance of northern states in their cooperative behaviors as well, with each
Goldstein scaled domestic conflict event corresponding to a decline in the proportion
of  a  northern state’s  cooperative  behavior  directed  toward the  southern state  by  .
000001%. Also unlike the previous period, former colonies appear to experience both
greater conflict and cooperation from their former colonial masters, by approximately .
4%. Like Models 1 and 2, time remains a significant factor, with each additional year
decreasing the proportion of North state’s activity directed to the south by ≈ .04% per
year.
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Conclusions
35 Evaluating the development of the Mediterranean as a region, we believe the evidence
suggests that this geopolitical space remains more an aspiration than an actual unique
clustering of multilateral behaviors. To the extent similarities do exist, they exist in the
state’s  similarity  in  economic  orientations  toward  the  large  economies  of  non-
Mediterranean Europe. This is not to say that no interactions exist.  France remains
active,  particularly  with  its  former  colonies  in  the  post-Cold  War  period,  yet  is
somewhat alone in engaging the region broadly. A few strong bilateral relationships
exist, either through economic exchanges as the case of Slovenia and Israel, or both
cooperative and conflictual interactions, as in the case of Libya and Italy.  However,
these instances of engagement remain restricted to isolated bilateral interactions and
do not represent broader regional engagement.
36 Particularly  troubling  for  the  future  of  Mediterranean  aspirations  is  the  clear
deterioration of interaction between states in the Mediterranean with one another over
the past decade. With the increased monetary, economic, and political integration of
the European Union, it is intuitively reasonable that most North Mediterranean states
have  increased  their  relative  focus  to  Europe  to  the  exclusion  of  the  South
Mediterranean states.
37 Given the strong driving focus of the EU in the broader geographic area, the best course
of  action for  the Mediterranean may be greater  inclusion in  the broader  European
space  than  a  separate  region  or  neighborhood  unto  itself.  Indeed,  the  network
diagrams of trading relationships indicate that this may be occurring informally along
economic lines. Missing, however, is the political engagement and formal institutional
architecture.  As  our  empirical  findings  suggest,  this  political  hesitance  is  no  doubt
driven by continuing domestic instability in the Maghreb and Middle East.  Political
engagement by the North more broadly, as opposed to just France, may further aim at
inclusion  of  the  Mediterranean  space  within  the  broader  European  cooperative
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Figure 1. Foreign Policy Directed toward South Mediterranean States
 
Figure 2. Cooperative Interactions between North-South Dyads, 1993-2002
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Figure 3. Cooperative interactions between North-South Dyads, 2003-2012
 
Figure 4. Conflict Interactions between North-South Dyads, 1993-2002
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Figure 5. Conflict Interactions between North-South Dyads, 2003-2012
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ABSTRACTS
Aspirations toward the economic and political integration of a Mediterranean region were and
continue to be articulated by potential members, with strong emphasis on “shared prosperity.”
We  attempt  to  evaluate  the  degree  to  which  the  past  17 years  of  aspirations  have  led  to
observable  economic  and  political  integration  between  potential  members.  Has  a  politically
relevant Mediterranean region begun to coalesce? How have levels of integration risen or fallen
since the original aspirations of integration were expressed in the wake of the Cold War? Which
factors  are  motivating  observed  integration?  To  accomplish  this  task,  we  first  evaluate  and
discuss levels of integration through qualitative network analysis of political interactions and
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trading relationships. Second, we identify the contexts in which Northern Mediterranean states
interact with the South, and whether those interactions are cooperative or conflictual. Northern
States appear to interact with former colonies, but a general avoidance of Southern states occurs
when those states experience domestic turmoil. However, overall levels of integration are limited
and in decline.
L’aspiration au développement d’une région méditerranéenne cohérente a été et continue à être
exprimée  par  des  membres  potentiels  de  l’Union,  avec  une  forte  rhétorique  en  faveur  de
l’intégration  dans  l’espoir  d’une  « prospérité  partagée ».  Nous  tentons  d’évaluer  dans  quelle
mesure les 17 dernières années de leurs aspirations ont conduit à l’intégration économique et
politique  effective  entre  membres  potentiels.  Une  région  de  la  Méditerranée  politiquement
pertinente a-t-elle commencé à se structurer ? Comment les niveaux d’intégration ont augmenté
ou diminué depuis l’aspiration initiale à l’intégration suite à la guerre froide ? Quels facteurs
motivent l’intégration observée ?  Pour mener à bien ce projet,  nous avons d’abord évalué et
discuté des niveaux d’intégration à travers une analyse de réseau qualitative des interactions
politiques et des relations commerciales. Puis, nous avons identifié les contextes dans lesquels les
pays méditerranéens du Nord interagissent avec le Sud, et si ces interactions sont coopératives
ou conflictuelles. Les États du Nord semblent interagir avec leurs anciennes colonies, mais en
évitant les États du Sud qui connaissent des troubles intérieurs. Cependant, les niveaux globaux
de l’intégration sont réduits et en recul.
INDEX
Mots-clés: analyse de réseau, commerce régional, intégration régionale, politique
méditerranéenne
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